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Abstract
This research establishes that in the presence of weak tax institutions, the quality
of public education is adversely a¤ected by an increase in inequality. Moreover, the
adverse e¤ect of inequality is diminishing on the quality of institutions, suggesting
that for su¢ ciently high quality of institutions, an increase in inequality would be
less harmful for the quality of education. This e¤ect operates via two channels,
namely via an e¤ect on the resources allocated to public education and via an
e¤ect on the number of individuals participating in the public schooling scheme.
Exploiting variations in the levels of inequality and corruption across countries, the
empirical analysis conrms the theoretical predictions.
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1 Introduction
The interaction between inequality and public education is the cornerstone of recent
policy debate focusing on the role of education on the observed trend of increasing income
inequality in developed countries during the last thirty years (see e.g. Atkinson, 2007;
Schütz et al, 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2008; OECD, 2008). In most of the relevant studies,
the issue under examination is the e¤ect of public education on the distribution of earnings
and consequently on income inequality (see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar 1992; 2003)
whereas the opposite e¤ect (i.e. the e¤ect of inequality on the size and the quality of
public education) has not been examined in fairly detailed way.
Similarly, the detrimental e¤ect of weak institutions on a wide range of economic and
social aspects of economies has been extensively analyzed, by primarily focusing on the
direct adverse e¤ects of corruption on government spending (Gupta et al., 2001; Mauro,
1998; Hessami, 2014).1 Interestingly though, corruption may operate via various alter-
native channels, that have been left relatively unexplored by the relevant literature. For
example corruption coexists and interacts with income inequality (see e.g. Chong and
Gradstein (2007); Roine (2006)). Focusing on public education the potential interaction
between corruption and inequality has not been extensively analyzed. Whereas corruption
hurts the quality of public education (Mauro, 1995), the only channel that has been ex-
plored by the relevant literature is that of the reduced government spending on education
due to corrupt government activities.2
The present paper seeks to contribute to two di¤erent strands of the literature. First
it contributes to the literature that explores the relationship between inequality and edu-
cation.3 More precisely, this paper explores the link from inequality towards the quality
of education and suggests that in the presence of weak institutions, inequality exerts a
1For a survey of the empirical literature examining the relation between corruption and public nances
Hillman (2004). For a general survey on literature of corruption see Aidt (2003).
2In particular, Mauro (1995) suggests that since social spending is more transparent compared to
other types of spending, public funds are directed towards less transparent activities.
3Previous studies examining the relationship between inequality and education include Glomm and
Ravikumar (1992) who argue that in societies where the majority of agents have incomes below average,
individuals will choose public schooling and Besley and Coate (1991) who nd that, in the presence of
inequality, public provision favors those with low income but involves greater deadweight loss. Finally,
Epple and Romano (1996) have formulated the "ends against the middle" hypothesis, according to which
the coalition of the "ends" in the income distribution (low and high incomes), reduces public school
spending. Most of these results have been empirically tested (Poterba, 1997; Harris, Evans and Schwab,
2001) and evidence suggests that support for public education is correlated to the income distribution of
the voters.
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detrimental impact on the quality of public education. This e¤ect operates via two chan-
nels. On the one hand, an increase in inequality a¤ects the revenue allocated to public
education, while on the other hand it a¤ects the number of people choosing to partici-
pate in the public schooling scheme. Specically, in the presence of weak institutions, an
increase in inequality will increase number of children in public schooling (since a larger
fraction of households will not being able to a¤ord private education) but this increase
will not be accompanied by the corresponding increase in public funds. Consequently, the
public spending per student will be reduced which in turn hurts the quality of education
provided. These nding complements previous theoretical studies that do not take into
account the impact of institutions and therefore nd a clear cut positive relation between
income inequality and the quality of public education (see e.g. De la Croix and Doepke,
2009). In line with the existing literature (Mauro, 1995, 1998; Gupta et al., 2002) we nd
that corruption has a negative e¤ect on education spending. Moreover, we argue that the
e¤ect of corruption on the quality of education, while it remains negative, its intensity
depends on the level of inequality.
Second, seeks to contribute to the literature that explores the choice between public
and private schooling. As Stiglitz (1974) claimed, the public provision of education was
originally desirable for its redistributive e¤ects. Glomm and Ravikumar, in a series of
papers (1992; 1998; 2001; 2003), have illustrated that coexistence of public and private
education is an equilibrium outcome and that, in the long run, public education works
towards closing the income gap between the rich and the poor.4 Moreover, they argue
that public spending on education (as a share of GNP) is increasing over time and that
the quality of education is increasing over time as well. This paper suggests that private
alternatives to the public education can indeed emerge and coexist but in the presence of
weak institutions, the quality of public education deteriorates whereas private education
remains signicantly superior.
In the theoretical part, we build an overlapping generations model with the preferences
of individuals being dened over consumption and their preference for children. When
it comes to children, individuals are faced with the standard quality-quantity trade-o¤,
4Evidence around the world indicates that public schooling is one of the most prevailing social policies
and that especially at early stages (elementary, secondary schooling) the fraction of students participating
in public schools is very high, i.e. in the US it is above 85% and in Canada it is above 95%.Additionally
according to the World Bank, most countries spend approximately 9%-15% of total government expendi-
ture on education (Greece- 9.2%, France-10.6, Germany-9.7%, US-14.1%). Still though, private schooling
spending comprises a signicant part of GDP, ranging from 0.1-3% in OECD countries (Busemeyer, 2007).
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namely the number of children they wish to have and the quality of education they choose
to provide for them (Galor and Moav, 2004; Galor, 2005; 2011). Individuals have the
option to tax evade where the probability of being caught depends on the overall quality
of institutions. Agents are heterogeneous only with respect to their income, allowing us
to capture the element of inequality. Our theoretical results are as follows: a) in the
presence of strong institutions and reduced tax evasion, inequality has a positive e¤ect
on the quality of public education, and b) in the presence of weak institutions and high
levels of tax evasion, increases in inequality reduce the quality of public education. The
intuition behind these results is due to a two-fold e¤ect; rst a direct e¤ect of tax evasion
on the level of public spending, and second an indirect e¤ect of tax evasion on the number
of children participating in public schooling.
In the empirical part, we examine the empirical validity of our theoretical model.
More precisely, we proceed to the estimation of an empirical model where the indepen-
dent variables are: (i) the international student assessment scores for Mathematics and
Science developed by PISA, OECD (2012) and (ii) the cognitive skills variable developed
Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) whereas the key explanatory variables are alternative
measures of income inequality.5 After extensive sensitivity analysis across a number of
di¤erent specications, our empirical ndings suggest that the relationship between qual-
ity of education and income inequality is indeed negative and statistically signicant, thus
conrming our theoretical priors. In turn, our empirical analysis places the spotlight on
the e¤ect of institutions on the nexus between income inequality and educational quality
by examining whether such a nexus is a¤ected by the quality of institutions. Our nd-
ings provide once again empirical evidence in favor of our theoretical model. Namely, in
countries characterized by poor governance, higher income inequality results in deterio-
ration of the quality of education, whereas in countries with solid institutions, increases
in inequality lead to improvement of educational quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
5Approximating the quality of education has been an issue of considerable disagreement in empirical
studies. Previous empirical studies basically rely on indirect measures such as the spending per student
or the pupil-teacher ratio (see e.g. De la Croix and Doepke, 2009) in order to capture the quality
of educational system. The major shortcoming of all these indirect measures is that they consist inputs
rather than outputs of the educational procedure and therefore fail to reect the quality of the educational
system in clear cut way (see e.g. Hanushek, 2003). In contrast, PISA OECD (2012) and Hanushek
and Woessmann (2012) measures are based on international student assessments tests (ISAT) and they
denitely consists outcomes of the educational procedure rather than inputs. Therefore these measures
are able to capture the quality of education in a more direct way.
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and derives the e¤ects of inequality on public education. Section 3 tests empirically our
theoretical predictions. Section 4 summarizes the main points.
2 The Model
We build upon the De la Croix and Doepke, henceforth C-D, (2009) model by introducing
the option to tax evasion and the presence of weak institutions. Interestingly, this modi-
cation yields interesting theoretical and empirical predictions that highlight the role of
institutions. For ease of comparison and for brevity, we use the same notation and omit
some of the details. Consider an overlapping generations economy consisting of a con-
tinuum of agents whose total mass is equal to 1. Economic activity extends over innite
time.
2.1 Demographics, Preferences and Budget Sets
All agents, endowed with one unit of time, care about their own consumption, c; and the
quantity and quality of their children, n and h; respectively:
ln(c) + (ln(n) +  ln(h));  > 0;  2 (0; 1): (1)
Each individual has a level of human capital, x, which is also equal to the wage
that this individual can obtain in the labor market, i.e., the wage rate per unit of human
capital is normalized to unity. We assume that x is uniformly distributed over the interval
[1  ; 1 + ]:
Human capital is being obtained via formal education provided by teachers, whose
wage is assumed equal to unity and equal to the average wage in the population. Parents
can enroll their children either to a public education system or to a private one. The
public education system provides the same level of education s to all students. It is
nanced through an income tax at the rate v; imposed on all adult agents in the economy
independently of their preferred mode of education for their children. For those parents
that choose the public education scheme no additional cost is applicable. The educational
quality, s; and the tax rate, v; are determined endogenously, via a voting procedure that
will be described below.
The private education system provides children with an education quality equal to e:
Parents pay for it out of their income at the expense of their own consumption. Education
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is measured in units of time of the average teacher and hence the cost of educating each
child in the private system is also e: This cost is assumed to be tax deductible. Besides
the education expenditure, raising a child requires a fraction  of a parents time. Hence,
a parents taxable income is x(1  n)  ne:
Crucially, individuals have the option to evade taxes. They decide what fraction 
to declare knowing that the detection probability is (1   );  > 0 is an institutional
parameter that captures the e¤ectiveness of the auditing mechanism. Delinquent tax
payers are charged a penalty rate  > 1 on evaded tax payments, which are v(1 )(x(1 
n)  ne).6 In sum, the budget constraint of an agent with human capital x is
c = (1  v  v(1  )2)(x(1  n)  ne); (2)
where  = : The term v + v(1   )2 is the e¤ective tax rate; recall that taxes
at a rate v are paid on a fraction  of taxable income and the expected penalty rate
(1 ) = (1 ) applies on evaded taxes: Given ; an improvement in tax institutions,
i.e., an increase in ; or an increase in the penalty rate  lead to an increase in the expected
penalty rate.
Agents can o¤er to their children either public, s, or private, e, education, but not
both. Therefore parents choosing public education choose e = 0. E¤ective education
is expressed as the maximum of the two, i.e., h = maxfe; sg: Substituting the budget
constraint (2) into an agents utility function (1) yields
u[x; v; ; n; e; s] = lnf(1  v  v(1  )2)(x(1  n)  ne)g+  lnn+  lnmaxfe; sg:
The sequence of events is the following. First, individuals make their decision over the
optimal number of children, n; educational quality e; 7 and the fraction of their taxable
income that they will declare to the tax authorities, : Second, all adults vote regarding
the tax rate v; and hence, given the government budget constraint (specied below), the
public education level, s:
2.2 Individual Choices and the Distribution of Income
For parents that provide public education to their o¤springs, the optimization problem is
maxu[x; v; ; n; 0; s] with respect to  and n: For these individuals the optimal fraction
6This assumption, besides the fact that it allows for analytical tractability, is a plausible one, since
most countries follow this practice.
7Parents who prefer public education will choose e = 0:
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of their income that will be reported to the tax authorities is
s = 1  1
2
: (3)
Equation (3) implies that the rate of tax evasion, 1 s; is constant and una¤ected by
the tax rate, v;8 or the income of the individual, x. Thus, all individuals, irrespectively
of their income, evade at the same rate. Instead, evasion rate is adversely a¤ected by
; implying that improvement in the institutional quality, ; or increases in the penalty
rate imposed on evaded tax, ; lead to a decrease in the tax evasion rate. The condition
 =   1=2 must be imposed, to ensure that s  0:
Also, as in C-D (2009), the number of children chosen by individuals who provide
public education to their o¤springs is
ns =

(1 + )
: (4)
Individuals have the option to choose a private education scheme for their o¤springs
if they are not satised with the quality of public education s. For parents planning
to provide private education to their o¤springs, the optimization problem reduces to
maxu[x; v; ; n; e; s] with respect to ; n and e: The optimal fraction of income that will
be reported to the tax authorities by these individuals is also
e = 1  1
2
: (5)
Similarly to the public education regime, the rate of tax evasion, 1   e; is independent
of the tax rate, v; and the income of the individuals, x: As it will become clear later, this
result, along with the other assumptions in C-D (2009) maintains the analysis tractable
by keeping the tax base constant (see C-D 2009 for details). In fact, from now on we
write s = e = :
The number of children and the level of education chosen by an individual who prefers
private education is
ne =
(1  )
(1 + )
(6)
and
8It is clear that this simplied formula is, among others, the outcome of the assumption that the ne
is imposed on evaded tax and not, for example, on evaded income. As already argued, this assumption
is not only plausible, but it also renders the model tractable.
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e =
x
1   : (7)
Interestingly, spending on private education is not directly a¤ected by ; i.e., the quality
of tax institutions  and the penalty rate .9
The parental cost of an individual that provides public education is nsx; which after
substituting from equation (4) is equal to x=1 + . Similarly, the parental spending of
an individual that chooses the private education scheme is given by nex + ne; which
after using equations (7) and (6) reduces also to x=1 + ; i.e., as in C-D (2009), overall
parental spending remains una¤ected by the choice of the educational regime. This in turn
implies the constancy of the tax base, an outcome that allows us to explore the underlying
mechanism behind the e¤ect of inequality on the quality of education. A direct implication
of this outcome, is that the taxable income of each individual remains una¤ected by the
choice between private or public schooling, since richer parents will have fewer children
to o¤set the increased spending on their education. In other words, the taxable income
of those who send their children to a public school is equal to x(1  ns) = x=1 + ; and
is equal to that of individuals who select a private school x(1  ne)  nee) = x=1 + :
By setting u[x; v; ; n; 0; s] = u[x; v; ; n; e; s]; we can nd the income level ~x of the
marginal household that is indi¤erent between choosing private or public education. This
is
~x =
1  

E[s]; (8)
where   (1  )1= and E[s] denotes the expected quality of public schooling. For given
E[s]; all agents with income above ~x choose private education whereas those with income
below ~x choose public education.
Recall our assumption that human capital follows a uniform distribution over the
interval [1  ; 1+ ]: Thus, the density function is g(x) = 0 for x < 1   and x > 1+ ,
whereas g(x) = 1=2 for 1    x  1 + : Therefore the fraction of children enrolled in
public schools (	) is
	 =
Z ~x
0
g(x)dx =
8<:
0 if ~x < 1  ;
~x (1 )
2
if 1    ~x  1 + ;
1 if ~x > 1 + :
(9)
9However, as will become clear below, these parameters a¤ect the quality of public education, s and,
hence, indirectly the decision regarding the education system, i.e., whether e = 0 or e > 0:
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2.3 Voting
The government provides public education under a balanced-budget rule:
~xZ
0
nssg[x]dx =
~xZ
0
v(x(1  ns))g[x]dx+
1Z
~x
v(x(1  ne)  nee[x])g[x]dx; (10)
where the LHS of (10) is the total spending on public education and the RHS equals tax
revenues collected by all agents, regardless of the education system that they choose.
Employing equations (3), (4), (5), (7) and (6), i.e., the individually optimal choices of
the rate of declared income, the amount of private education and the fertility rates, the
government budget constraint reduces to the following equation
v =
	

s: (11)
Given v, the level of education s follows from (11) and vice versa. Naturally, the higher
the fraction of children participating in the public schooling system, 	; and the higher the
quality of public education, s; the higher the tax rate. Moreover, the higher the fraction
of income that individuals declare to the tax authorities, ; the lower the tax rate.
As in C-D (2009), the level of public spending and thus implicitly of taxes is determined
via a probabilistic voting model, which allows for the smooth aggregation of all voters
preferences. The voting outcome follows from the maximization of the following objective
function

(s) =
~xZ
0
u[x; v; s; 0; s]g[x]dx+
1Z
~x
u[x; v; p; e[x]; 0]g[x]dy (12)
subject to the government budget constraint (11).
Solving the above optimization problem and using equations (3) and (5) yields the
quality of public education
s =
2(2   1)
(1 + 	)(4   1) : (13)
Next, using equations (13) and (11), we have that the corresponding tax rate is
v =
4	
(1 + 	)(4   1) : (14)
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2.4 Education Regimes
Three alternative education regimes can emerge: i) a fully private education regime (	 =
0), where all children attend private schools; ii) a fully public education regime (	 = 1),
in which case all individuals send their o¤springs to public schools and iii) segregation
(	 2 (0; 1)), where there are private and public schools and the richer individuals provide
private education to their children while the rest use public schools.10
Assumption 1. The parameters of the model satisfy:
 < ~  2(1     )

:
Assumption 1 puts a restriction on the preference parameter towards children : If it is
not satised then 	 takes values in the interval [0; 1=2); i.e., for the percentage of student
population that attends public school is lower than fty. We note that C-D (2009) argue
that their Assumption 1,  < (1     )=; "is the empirically relevant case" (p. 606).
Their assumption is clearly a su¢ cient condition for our assumption to hold (see also
footnote 11 in C-D 2009 and C-D 2003).
The following proposition gives the conditions under which each education regime
arises.
Proposition 1.
i) If  < 1  2(1 ) (1 )4((1 ) (1 )) ; then the fully private regime arises.
ii) If  > 2  2(1 ) (1+)(1+)4[(1 ) (1+)(1+)] , then the fully public regime arises.
iii) If  2 (1; 2); then there is segregation; the richest individuals send their children
to private schools, while the rest attend public schools. In particular, if  ? ~ 2 (1; 2);
then 	 ? 1=2; where ~  4(1 ) (2+)
4[2(1 ) (2+)] :
Proof. All proofs are presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 suggests that tax institutions play a critical role in the emergence of the
equilibrium outcome. If the quality of tax institutions is very low, implying a very high
tax evasion rate, the public revenue and hence the quality of public education is so low
that all individuals send their children to private schools, i.e., a fully private education
regime emerges. We note that in the C-D (2009) setting, where tax institutional quality is
10The existence of an equilibrium with 	 2 [0; 1] is essentially the same as that in C-D (2009) and thus
omitted.
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not considered, the fully private is not an equilibrium. There, if the number of students is
low, then the quality public education (measured as spending per student) is su¢ ciently
high, which induces the poorest parents to send their children to public schools.
For high-enough quality of tax institutions, the tax evasion rate is low and hence pub-
lic revenue and spending per student are high. This makes even the richest individual to
prefer public to private schools.11 Finally, for an intermediate level of institutional quality,
which is perhaps the case for most countries, the two regime co-exist. The richer individ-
uals send their children to private schools and the poorer to public schools. Assumption 1
guarantees that a positive level of institutional quality ~; which divides the student pop-
ulation equally between private and public schools, exists. Figure 1 depicts the relation
between 1; 2; and ~ and indicates the education regime that emerges depending on the
level of institutional quality.
The following proposition establishes the e¤ect of inequality on segregation, the quality
of the public schools and the tax rate.
Proposition 2. Whenever there is segregation, i.e., 	 2 (0; 1);
If  Q ~; then @	
@
R 0; @s
@
Q 0; and @v
@
R 0:
According to Proposition 2, in the presence of weak tax institutions, i.e.,  < ~; an
increase in inequality (an increase in ) leads to a higher share of public schooling (	),
lower quality of public schooling (s) and a higher tax rate. When institutions are weak and
there is a lot of tax evasion, the fraction of the population that prefers public schooling
is small because the quality of public schooling is low. As inequality increases and total
income is redistributed, the income of the marginal person, who was indi¤erent between
11Note that for 2 to be positive and greater than 1=2, it is required that the income inequality be
su¢ ciently compressed. More specically,  < [(1  )=(1 + )]  1: If this condition does not hold we
have either segmentation or the private education regime.
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private and public schooling before the change in , decreases and this person prefers now
public schooling. This raises the number of students in the public school system. Despite
the fact that the tax rate increases, the change in the participation rate is higher and
hence the spending per student (quality of public education) decreases.
We note that C-D (2009), who do not consider di¤erences in institutional quality, nd
the opposite results from those in the previous paragraph; such results emerge in our case
when the quality of tax institutions is su¢ ciently high,  > ~: More specically, in the
presence of weak tax institutions, an increase in inequality leads to a lower share of public
schooling, higher quality of public schooling and a lower tax rate.
3 Cross-Country Evidence
This section empirically explores the hypothesis suggested by the theory, that (i) in the
presence of weak tax institutions, an increase in inequality adversely a¤ects the quality of
public education and, (ii) in the presence of strong institutions, an increase in inequality
positively a¤ects the quality of public schooling. Overall, the purpose of the empirical
part is to explore if indeed this reversal on the e¤ect of inequality on the quality of public
education can take place under di¤erent levels of institutional quality.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
First, the analysis establishes, the adverse e¤ect of inequality on the quality of public
education. The following empirical model is employed to study this relation,
Qualityi = a0 + 1Ginii + kControlsi + Continental Fixed E¤ectsi + ui; (15)
Accordingly, the quality of the educational system in country i is expressed as a function
of income inequality, a set of control variables, geographical dummies and a stochastic
term ui. To estimate equation (15) we build a cross-section data set of 63 -developed
and developing- countries. The dependent and explanatory variables are discussed be-
low. Explicit denitions, descriptive statistics and sources for the variables employed are
provided in Table A.
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3.2 Data
Quality of Education measures Approximating the quality of education has been
an issue of considerable disagreement in empirical studies.12 In this paper, we employ
as dependent variables direct, international student assessments scores. More precisely
we use: (i) The Programme for International Student Assessments (PISA) scores for
Mathematics and Science and (ii) the cognitive skillsvariable developed by Hanushek
and Woessmann (2012) based on 12 di¤erent international student achievements tests
(ISATs).
PISA surveys are international studentsevaluations that take place every three years
in a large number of countries starting from year 2000. PISA surveys test reading, mathe-
matics, and scientic literacy in terms of general competencies, that is, how well students
can apply the knowledge and skills that they have learned at school to real-life challenges.
Schools in each country are randomly selected by the international contractor for partic-
ipation in PISA and participating students are nearing the end of compulsory education
(their average age is 15 years old). In this study, we employ data from the second (year
2003), the third (year 2006) and the fourth (year 2009) PISA surveys. Specically, we
focus on: (i) the average PISA score in Mathematics for the period 2003-2009 (denoted
as "PISA Mathematics"), (ii) the average PISA score in Science (denoted as "PISA Sci-
ence") and (iii) the average PISA score in Reading for the same time period (denoted
"PISA Reading"). Taking data from these sub-components, we construct a composite in-
dex (denoted as "PISA (mean)") that is the average PISA score in Mathematics, Science
and Reading. "PISA (mean)" is the basic dependent variable in our analysis.
Moreover, we employ the average test score in math and science, in primary through
the end of secondary school (denoted as "Hanushek and Woessmann Cognitive") and
the average test score in math and science, only in lower secondary school (denoted as
"Hanushek and Woessmann LowSec") developed by Hanushek and Woessmann (2012).
Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) cognitive skillsmeasures are based on a total of twelve
international student achievements tests that were conducted from 1964 to 2003.13
12Previous empirical studies in order to capture the quality of educational system rely on several indirect
measures such as the spending per student or the pupil-teacher ratio (see, for example, C-D 2009). The
major shortcoming of all these indirect measures is that they constitute inputs rather than outputs of
the educational procedure and therefore fail to reect the quality of the educational system in a clear-cut
way. For an extensive critique of the input-based measure of education see Hanushek (2003, 2008).
13The rst international studentsachievement test that was included as primary source in Hanushek
and Woessmann (2012) is the First International Mathematics Study (FIMS), which was conducted in
1964, whereas the last one is the second PISA survey, which took place in 2003. Fore more details regard-
12
The basic advantage of both PISA and Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) cognitive
skillsmeasures is that they are comparable across di¤erent countries. Moreover, they
denitely constitute outcomes of the educational procedure rather than inputs in it.
Income Inequality Measures In order to control for income inequality, we rely on
three alternative Inequality Databases and we employ six alternative proxies of income in-
equality. Our benchmark inequality variable -which is employed in most of our specications-
is the Gini coe¢ cient developed by the Texas University Inequality Project (2003) (de-
noted as "texgini"). Note that "texgini" is the average over the period 1980-2002.
In order to test the robustness of our baseline results we also employ two alternative
inequality proxies: (i) the income share held by the richest 20% of the population (denoted
as "Ineq_20"), which is taken from World Bank (World Development Indicators (WDI),
2011) and (ii) the Gini coe¢ cient before taxes and transfers, which was developed by Solt
(2009) (denoted as "gini_Solt"). Both alternative inequality variables are also averages
over the period 1980-2002.
Control Variables To ensure robust econometric identication, we use a number of
control variables in the estimated equations. First, to control for the overall level of
productivity and wealth in the economy, we employ the logarithm of real GDP per capita
(denoted as "gdppercap"). Data for this variable is from the World Bank (WDI, 2011).
Countries with higher real income are expected to have better educational systems.
In addition, we account for the e¤ect of democracy (denoted as "democracy"), since it
is expected democratic regimes to exert a positive e¤ect on the quality of education and
human capital accumulation. Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) uncovered a positive e¤ect of
democracy on human capital accumulation, whereas Lindert (2004) documented how the
extension of the franchise in European rising democracies gradually led to the introduction
of public funding for education over the 19th and 20th centuries. Our data regarding the
level of democracy within a country are taken from Polity IV (2004) Database. In order
to control for the e¤ect of elderly people on the per capita spending on education and
consequently on the quality of education (see, for example, Poterba (1995); Harris et al.
(2001)), we employ as explanatory variable the share of the population aged 64 and over
(denoted as "Old"). Data for "Old" are obtained from WDI (2011).
ing the primary sources employed as well as the methodology followed, see Hanushek and Woessmann
(2012).
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Finally, we account for the presence of economies of scale in the provision of education
at the country level, by controlling (i) for population density measured by the number of
people per square km (denoted as "density") and (ii) for ethnic fractionalization (denoted
as "ethnic"). Data for density are obtained from the WDI (2011) whereas data for ethnic
are from Alesina et al. (2003). Lower population density and higher levels of ethnic
fractionalization may lead to lower quality of education due to diseconomies of scale
and higher per capita cost in the provision of education. (see, for example, Alesina and
Wacziarg, 1998; Alesina et al., 2003). Moreover, in more extreme circumstances, increased
ethnic fractionalization may lead to ethnic hatred and, ultimately, to violent civil wars
that disrupt the workings of the whole economy (see Fearon, 2003). All explanatory
variables are averages over the period 1980-2002.
3.3 Empirical Findings
In the following subsections we discuss the results of our empirical analysis, which are
presented in Tables 1-6.
3.3.1 Testing the e¤ect of income inequality on the quality of education
We start by estimating equation (15), using the data and the empirical methodology
outlined in the previous sub-section. The results are reported in Table 1.
In Columns (1) to (8) of Table 1, PISA(mean) is regressed on texgini as well as on a
set of control variables, namely, "gdppercap", "publspending", "density", "democracy",
"ethnic", "old" and "fertility"). All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and
robust standard errors. The set of regional dummies includes a xed e¤ect for East Asia
(AsiaE), Latin America or the Caribbean (LaAm), Europe and Central Asia (EurAsiaC)
and North America (NAm).
As can be seen, "texgini" enters with a negative and highly signicant coe¢ cient, which
remains qualitatively intact in all eight alternative specications. This result indicates
that higher income inequality is associated with lower values of PISA scores, i.e., lower
educational quality. This nding is in accordance with the testable hypothesis driven by
the theoretical model
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, we observe that all of
them bear the expected -based on the theory- sign. More precisely, "gdppercapita" and
"democracy" bear positive and signicant coe¢ cients indicating that richer and more de-
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mocratic countries are characterized by better educational systems. This result is in line
with the empirical ndings of Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) and Murtin and Wacziarg
(2011). On the other hand, "ethnic" enters with a negative coe¢ cient highlighting the
negative e¤ect of increased ethnic fractionalization on the quality of education. This re-
sult can be explained by taking into account the diseconomies of scale in the provision
of education that come as a result of increased ethno-linguistic fractionalization (see, for
example, Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). A similar explanation can be given to the pos-
itive and signicant coe¢ cient of density; namely, increased population density ensures
economies of scale in the provision of education, lower per capita cost and consequently
higher quality for given level of spending. Finally, "Old" enters with negative and signi-
cant coe¢ cient, indicating the negative e¤ect of elderly people on the quality of education.
This result is in line with the hypothesis of Poterba (1995) -concerning the e¤ect of el-
derly people on the per capita spending on education- as well as the empirical ndings of
Poterba (1997) and Harris et al. (2001).
In Table 2, we inquire into the robustness of our baseline results by investigating
whether the negative impact of inequality on the quality of education survives under
alternative measures of educational quality, income inequality and alternative estimation
techniques. To this end, in Column (2) we repeat the benchmark estimation presented in
Column (8) of Table 1 (reproduced for convenience in Column (1) of Table 2) by keeping
intact the set of the controls and excluding solely the regional dummies. Then, in Column
(3) we re-estimate the equation presented in Column (1) by excluding the 10 per cent of
the outliers from the sample. As can be immediately veried, our results regarding the
e¤ect of "texgini" remain qualitatively identical to those presented in Column (1).
In Columns (4) and (5) of Table 2, we employ two alternative income inequality
variables in order to investigate whether our main ndings remain robust under di¤erent
inequality measures. Specically, in Column (4) we re-estimate the equation presented in
Column (1), by employing instead of the "texgini" the share of income held by the richest
20% of the population (denoted as "Ineq_20"), whereas in Column (5) we employ the Gini
coe¢ cient developed by Solt (2009) (denoted as "Gini_Solt"). As can be easily veried,
both alternative income inequality measures bear negative and statistically signicant
coe¢ cients indicating that our benchmark results remain robust under di¤erent income
inequality measures.
In Columns (6) to (10) of Table 2, we employ as dependent variables di¤erent mea-
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sures of educational quality. More accurately, in Columns (6), (7) and (8) we employ the
PISA Mathematics, the PISA Science and the PISA Reading, respectively, whereas in
Columns (9) and (10) we employ the cognitive skillsvariables developed by Hanushek
and Woessmann (2012), based on 12 di¤erent international student achievement tests
(ISATs). Specically, in Column (9) we employ the basic cognitive skills variable, which
reect the average performance in math and science in primary through the end of sec-
ondary school ("Hanushek and Woessmann Cognitive"), and in Column (10) we use the
"Hanushek and Woessmann LowSec" variable, which reects the average test score in
math and science in lower secondary school. As can be seen, the coe¢ cient on "texgini"
is negative and signicant at a level of one percent in most of the alternative specica-
tions, indicating that our benchmark empirical ndings are not a¤ected by the measures
of educational quality employed.
As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, there exists a potential reverse
causality problem between income inequality and quality of education. This is because
lower quality educational systems may result in higher income inequality within a country
rather than vice versa. In Columns (11) to (16), we treat the potential reverse causality
problem by employing an instrumental variables approach.14 Two obvious choices for
instrument for income inequality are: (i) the government transfers (as a share of GDP)
and (ii) the progressivity of national tax system. This is because larger government
transfers and higher tax progressivity is expected to be associated with lower levels of
income inequality (see e.g. Barr, 1992; Mahler and Jesuit, 2006; OECD, 2008) whereas,
on the other hand, government transfers and tax progressivity per se is not expected to
a¤ect the quality of education. Our data on government transfers (denoted as "Transfers")
are taken from World Bank Development Indicators (2011). In order to develop an index
of the tax progressivity, we construct a ratio the top statutory tax rate on corporate
prots to the average corporate tax rate (denoted as "TaxProgress"). All tax data are
taken from Djankov et al. (2010). "TaxProgress" captures the distance between top and
average tax rate and therefore reects the progressivity of tax system.
We report the results in Columns (11) to (16). Estimation method is two-stage least
squares (2SLS) with geographical dummies and robust standard errors. First stage results,
(reported in the upper part of the columns) show that our instruments are signicant
14In order to tackle the causality issue in the estimations presented in Table 1 and in Columns (1) to
(10) of Table 2 we have decided to employ as dependent variables averages over the period 2002-2010
whereas our set of controls includes averages over the period 1980-2002.
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determinants of income inequality. The good t of the instruments is also conrmed by
the Hansen J over-identication test, that report no rejection of the relevant hypothesis
(i.e. that the over-identication restrictions are valid).15
Concerning the results of the second stage our ndings remain qualitatively similar to
those presented in previous estimations. More precisely in Column (11) the dependent
variable PISA(mean) is regressed on texgini and on the standard set of control variables,
namely, gdppercap, publspending, density, democracy, ethnic, old and fertility, following
the empirical strategy described in the previous above. Similarly, we estimate equations
(12) to (16) where the dependent variables are PISAMathematics PISAScience, PIS-
AReading, Hanushek and Woessmann Cognitive and Hanushek and Woessmann LowSec
correspondingly. As can be seen, the coe¢ cient on "texgini" is negative and highly sig-
nicant in all alternative specications, indicating that reverse causality does not drive
the ndings of the main analysis above.
3.3.2 Examining the e¤ect of governance on the nexus between income in-
equality and quality of education.
In this sub-section we seek to place the spotlight on the e¤ect of governance on the nexus
between income inequality and educational quality. According to our theoretical model
in countries characterized by poor governance and weak institutional framework, higher
income inequality results in deterioration of the quality of education. In sharp contrast,
our theoretical model predicts that increases on income inequality improve the quality of
education, in countries with sound institutional framework.
To identify the potential di¤erential e¤ect of institutional framework on the rela-
tionship between income inequality and quality of education we estimate the following
equation:
Qualityi = a0 + 1Ginii + 2Institutions+ 3Gini*Institutions
+kControlsi + Continental Fixed E¤ectsi + ui (16)
Accordingly, we introduce in our basic specication a variable capturing the quality of
institutions (Institutions) and an interaction term (Gini*Institutions). To allow inter-
preting the impact of 1 and 2 at their mean values, we estimate the interaction e¤ect
15For more details on these issues see Baum et al. (2007).
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comprising of the mean centered Gini and Institutions.16 More precisely, we introduce
the multiplicative variables: (i) "texgini_dif*Governance_dif", (ii) "texgini_dif*Rule of
Law_dif" and (iii) "texgini_dif*Accountability_dif". The variable "Governance_dif" is
the mean-centered of the "Government E¤ectiveness" measure developed by Kaufmann
et al. (2010) with higher values denoting better quality of governance.17 Similarly, the
"Rule of Law_dif" and the "Accountability_dif" are the mean-centered measures of the
"Rule of Law" and "Voice and Accountability" variables developed by Kaufmann et al.
(2010).18
By introducing these interaction terms we allow the e¤ect of "texgini" to vary across
countries characterized by di¤erent institutional framework. According to our theoretical
model the coe¢ cient of the interaction term must be positive and signicant. Moreover,
standard calculus tells us that the turning point in the data is given by the coe¢ cient of
"texgini" divided by the coe¢ cient of the interaction term (see, for example, Dutt and
Mitra 2002; Adam et al., 2012). This method allows us to examine rst whether a change
in the sign of "texgini" indeed exists and also to determine it endogenously.
The results of this experiment are presented on Table 3. As the reader can easily verify
the coe¢ cients of: (i) "texgini_dif*Governance_dif", (ii) "texgini_dif*Rule of Law_dif"
and (iii) "texgini_dif*Accountability_dif" are all positive and statistically signicant in
all alternative specications. These ndings are in line with the implications driven by our
theoretical model; namely, in countries characterized by poor (resp. sound) governance
and bad (resp. good) institutional framework, higher income inequality leads to deterio-
ration (resp. improvement) on the quality of education. What do these nding suggest
about the e¤ect of income inequality on the quality of education? Does the institutional
framework a¤ect the impact of inequality on the quality of education in the real world?
Focusing on the estimation presented in Column (3) we can calculate the estimated turn-
ing point on the e¤ect of inequality which is a "Governance" value around 2.1.19 As
16By taking di¤erences from the mean (mean-centered variables), we avoid the potential problem of
multicollinearity between the constitutive terms and the interaction term, whereas our results do not
change qualitatively.
17Based on Kaufmann et al. (2010) "Government E¤ectiveness" captures perceptions of the quality
of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the governments commitment to such
policies.
18According to Kaufmann et al. (2010) "Rule of Law" captures perceptions of the extent to which
agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Voice and
accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a countrys citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
19The turning point in the data is given by the coe¢ cient of "texgini" divided by the coe¢ cient of the
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can be easily veried this value is larger than the maximum value of "Governance_dif"
that is around 1.5.20 Therefore, we conclude that although our empirical ndings provide
support in favour of our theoretical model, in the real world the turning point for the
coe¢ cient of texgini (suggested by our theoretical model) is never met. This is because
even the best practice country of our sample (Finland) in which "Governance_dif" takes
the maximum value 1.5) is characterized by relatively poor institutional framework (com-
pared to that required by the theoretical model in order to generate the reverse e¤ect).
Thus, our empirical model suggests that the magnitude of the e¤ect of income inequality
on the quality of education varies with the quality of the institutions but -in practice-
remains always negative.
4 Concluding Remarks
This research establishes that in the presence of weak institutions, the quality of public
education is adversely a¤ected by an increase in inequality. Moreover, the adverse e¤ect
of inequality is diminishing on the quality of institutions. This e¤ect operates via two
channels, namely via an e¤ect on the resources allocated to public education and via an
e¤ect on the number of individuals participating in the public schooling scheme.
The empirical ndings conrm the theoretical predictions, i.e., that inequality has an
adverse e¤ect on the quality of public education and this result is valid for a broad set
of countries, manifesting large variation in the quality of institutions. More analytically,
it is established, that the adverse e¤ect of inequality is diminishing on the quality of
institutions, thereby suggesting that for su¢ ciently high level of institutions, an increase
in inequality would be less harmful for the quality of education, and this e¤ect could
potentially be reversed for overly good institutions.
Exploring the policy implications of our research extends beyond the scope of the
paper. However, our ndings overall suggest that reducing income inequality can help to
improve the quality of public education.
interaction term "texgini_dif*Governance_dif".
20Since the maximum value of Governance is 2.12 and the mean value of Governance is 0.62 (see
Appendix A) the maximum value for Governance_dif (which is the di¤erence from the mean)does not
exceed 1.5.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1 : (i) Recall that ~x denotes the income level of the marginal in-
dividuals that is indi¤erent between choosing private or public education. Individuals
with income higher than ~x prefer private education, while those with income lower than
~x prefer public education. It follows from equations (8) and (13) that in equilibrium
~x[	] =
1  

1
1 + 	
2(2   1)
4   1 :
Let ~x denote the value of ~x when 	 =  : Note that ~x is decreasing in 	 and hence
~x 1 > ~x 2 ; for  2 >  1: The private regime is then the equilibrium outcome if ~x0 < 1 ;
that is, as 	 tends to zero the threshold level at which one is indi¤erent between public
and private schools is below the income of the poorest person.21 Hence, even the poorest
person prefers private to public education. Solving this inequality yields  < 1 presented
in the proposition.
(ii) A public education regime (	 = 1) is an equilibrium if even the richest person prefers
public over private schools, i.e., ~x1 > 1+: Solving this inequality yields  > 2 presented
in the proposition.
(ii) If ~x0 > 1   and ~x1 < 1 + ; then there is segregation, i.e., the equality
	 =
~x  (1  )
2
=
1 

1
1+	
2(2 1)
4 1   (1  )

(A1)
is satised for a value of 	 =  2 (0; 1): In such a regime, individuals with income
greater than ~x prefer private education while those with income below ~x prefer public
education. Solving the two inequalities we get  2 (1; 2): Next, we set 	 = 1=2 in (A1)
and solve for  to get ~: Solving (A1) with respect to 	 gives two functions of 	[], only
one of which takes positive values. This function is continuous and increasing in : It
follows then that if  ? ~; then 	 ? 1=2: 
Proof of Proposition 2 : The Proof is similar to that of Proposition 3 in C-D (2009). From
equations (8) and (9) we obtain:
	 =
1 

s  (1  )

:
21Alternatively, it su¢ ces to show that the public education regime or any segregation are not equi-
librium outcomes. The inequality ~x0 < 1    implies that ~x1 < 1 +  (because ~x1 < ~x0) and hence
public education is not an equilibrium; when 	 = 1; the richest person prefers private education. Also,
~x < 1    for any  > 0 and hence segregation is not an equilibrium; when 	 =  ; even the poorest
person has income above the threshold level ~x :
20
Taking the derivative with respect to  we obtain:
@	
@
=
1

(
1
2
 	):
Thus, @	
@
R 0 , 1
2
R 	: It follows then from Proposition 2 that if  Q ~; then @	
@
R 0:
The other results follow from equations (13) and (14). 
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Table 1: The Effect of Income Inequality on the Quality of Education: Basic Regressions 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PISA (Mean) 
 
PISA (Mean) 
 
PISA (Mean) 
 
PISA (Mean) 
 
PISA (Mean) 
 
PISA (Mean) 
 
PISA (Mean) 
 
PISA (Mean) 
 
texgini -6.173*** -3.676*** -3.361*** -3.474*** -3.214*** -2.818*** -3.062*** -2.920*** 
 (-4.971) (-4.141) (-4.169) (-3.796) (-3.564) (-3.745) (-4.003) (-3.706) 
gdppercap  22.211*** 21.194*** 21.288*** 15.499*** 12.984*** 10.788** 10.600** 
  (4.938) (4.314) (4.240) (3.079) (3.313) (2.272) (2.299) 
publspending   4.173 3.814 1.336 0.836 2.121 1.806 
   (0.961) (0.808) (0.313) (0.206) (0.558) (0.484) 
density    -0.001 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
    (-0.352) (3.364) (4.882) (3.678) (3.061) 
democracy     2.546** 2.697*** 3.309*** 2.727** 
     (2.239) (2.747) (3.016) (2.413) 
ethnic      -36.059 -39.796* -32.985 
      (-1.680) (-1.740) (-1.400) 
old       -2.281 -1.617 
       (-1.337) (-0.982) 
fertility        -9.307 
        (-0.859) 
Geographical 
Dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 55 55 55 55 51 51 51 51 
R2 0.69 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.88 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable is the composite PISA score average in 
Mathematics, Science and Reading. All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors.  The set of regional dummies 
includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), Latin America or the Caribbean (LaAm), Europe and Central Asia (EurAsiaC) and North America (NAm). 
The *, ** and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
Table 2: The Effect of Income Inequality on the Quality of Education: Sensitivity of Results 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
Mathematics 
PISA 
Science 
 
PISA 
Reading 
Hanushek 
and 
Woessmann 
Cognitive 
Hanushek 
and 
Woessmann  
LowSec 
 
texgini -2.920*** -3.336*** -2.243*** 
  
-2.392** -3.577*** -2.791*** -0.021*** -0.021** 
 (-3.706) (-4.342) (-2.782)   (-2.483) (-4.458) (-2.761) (-2.796) (-2.290) 
Ineq_20    -1.955*       
    (-1.723)       
Gini_Solt     -1.100*      
     (-1.757)      
gdppercap 10.600** 12.397** 11.856*** 26.097*** 25.987*** 10.786** 10.089** 10.926** 0.033 0.064 
 (2.299) (2.514) (2.903) (3.439) (3.346) (2.187) (2.240) (2.162) (0.713) (1.253) 
density 1.806 4.247 4.353 4.091 4.499 5.337 -0.978 1.059 0.037 0.034 
 (0.484) (1.275) (1.224) (0.947) (1.073) (1.228) (-0.265) (0.254) (0.917) (0.752) 
democracy 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.011 0.005 0.007 0.016*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.061) (3.021) (0.242) (0.938) (1.104) (4.085) (2.570) (2.245) (2.844) (2.704) 
ethnic 2.727** 1.768 2.519** 1.433 1.883 2.126* 2.730** 3.324** -0.005 -0.014 
 (2.413) (1.491) (2.225) (1.244) (1.502) (1.736) (2.226) (2.338) (-0.319) (-0.842) 
publspending -32.985 -27.819 -32.308 -8.854 -15.131 -37.793 -24.892 -36.271 -0.299 -0.322 
 (-1.400) (-1.235) (-1.618) (-0.428) (-0.777) (-1.334) (-1.181) (-1.340) (-1.097) (-1.040) 
old -1.617 -2.556 -2.941* -4.662** -3.957** -2.147 -1.422 -1.283 0.025 0.024 
 (-0.982) (-1.332) (-1.939) (-2.172) (-2.054) (-1.212) (-0.895) (-0.707) (1.266) (1.041) 
fertility -9.307 -13.836 -19.882** -9.335 -7.882 -10.109 -11.755 -6.058 -0.252** -0.281** 
 (-0.859) (-1.316) (-2.283) (-0.938) (-0.730) (-0.921) (-1.076) (-0.506) (-2.389) (-2.524) 
Geographical 
Dummies 
yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 51 51 45 52 53 51 51 51 63 63 
R2 0.88 0.85 0.91 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.77 0.76 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors 
(except otherwise noted). The set of regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), Latin America or the Caribbean (LaAm), Europe and Central 
Asia (EurAsiaC) and North America (NAm). In Columns (1)-(5), the dependent variable is the composite PISA score average in Mathematics, Science and 
Reading.  In Column (2) the regression is estimated without regional dummies. In Column (3) a 10 percent of the outliers is excluded from our sample. We 
present the results of the second stage. In Columns (4) and (5) the regressions are estimated with alternative proxies for income inequality. Specifically in Column 
 (4) is employed the income share held by the highest 20% (Ineq_20) and in Column (5) is employed the Gini coefficient developed by Solt (2009) [denoted as 
Gini_Solt]. In Columns (6)-(8) the dependent variables are the PISA scores in: (i) Mathematics, (ii) Science and (iii) Reading, respectively. Finally, n Columns 
(9) and (10) the dependent variables are the Hanushek and Woessmann (2012) cognitive skills measure and the Hanushek and Woesmann (2012) cognitive skills 
measure in lower secondary school respectively. In Columns (11)-(16) regressions are estimated with two-stage least squares (2SLS). The results of the first stage 
are reported on the upper part of the Columns and the results of the second stage below. The *, ** and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively.   
Table 2: The Effect of Income Inequality on the Quality of Education: Sensitivity of Results 
 
 
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dependent 
Variable PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
Mathematics 
PISA 
Science 
 
PISA 
Reading 
Hanushek 
and 
Woessmann 
Cognitive 
Hanushek 
and 
Woessmann  
LowSec 
First-stage results       
Transfers -0.264** -0.264** -0.264** -0.264** -0.264** -0.264** 
 (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.21) (-2.21) 
TaxProgress -1.270 -1.270 -1.270 -1.270 -1.270 -1.270 
 (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.19) (-1.19) 
 Second-Stage Results 
texgini -6.310** -6.354** -6.112** -6.463* -0.065* -0.068* 
 (-2.323) (-2.503) (-2.449) (-1.906) (-1.745) (-1.760) 
gdppercap 30.080** 28.625** 27.775** 33.839*** 0.022 0.048 
 (2.718) (2.540) (2.574) (2.830) (0.185) (0.337) 
publspending -6.674 -4.531 -7.654 -7.838 -0.032 -0.038 
 (-1.274) (-0.900) (-1.413) (-1.316) (-0.386) (-0.423) 
density -0.006 -0.000 -0.007 -0.012 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.947) (-0.050) (-1.041) (-1.637) (0.827) (0.775) 
democracy 0.170 0.586 0.133 -0.211 0.007 -0.003 
 (0.086) (0.292) (0.068) (-0.099) (0.403) (-0.124) 
ethnic 11.887 13.443 10.445 11.773 -0.195 -0.250 
 (0.382) (0.400) (0.374) (0.339) (-0.427) (-0.459) 
old -7.012*** -6.874*** -6.406*** -7.757*** 0.004 0.003 
 (-3.821) (-3.213) (-3.728) (-3.699) (0.113) (0.063) 
fertility 3.898 3.232 -0.072 8.533 -0.128 -0.157 
 (0.387) (0.324) (-0.007) (0.738) (-0.947) (-1.046) 
Geographical 
Dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 47 47 47 47 52 52 
R2 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.81 0.76 0.75 
Hansen J       
       
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are 
estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors (except otherwise noted). The set of 
regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), Latin America or the Caribbean 
(LaAm), Europe and Central Asia (EurAsiaC) and North America (NAm).  In Columns (1)-(5), the 
dependent variable is the composite PISA score average in Mathematics, Science and Reading. In 
Column (2) the regression is estimated without regional dummies. In Column (3) a 10 percent of the 
outliers is excluded from our sample. We present the results of the second stage. In Columns (4) and 
(5) the regressions are estimated with alternative proxies for income inequality. Specifically in 
Column (4) is employed the income share held by the highest 20% (Ineq_20) and in Column (5) is 
employed the Gini coefficient developed by Solt (2009) [denoted as Gini_Solt]. In Columns (6)-(8) the 
dependent variables are the PISA scores in: (i) Mathematics, (ii) Science and (iii) Reading, 
respectively. Finally, n Columns (9) and (10) the dependent variables are the Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2012) cognitive skills measure and the Hanushek and Woesmann (2012) cognitive skills 
measure in lower secondary school respectively. In Columns (11)-(16) regressions are estimated with 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). The results of the first stage are reported on the upper part of the 
Columns and the results of the second stage below. The *, ** and *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
Table 3: The impact of institutions on the nexus between income inequality and education quality. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
PISA 
(Mean) 
 
texgini -4.409*** -3.659*** -3.634*** -4.458*** -3.822*** -3.874*** -4.412*** -3.661*** -4.045*** 
 (-3.961) (-3.712) (-3.557) (-4.390) (-4.135) (-4.153) (-5.078) (-3.864) (-3.853) 
texgini_dif*Governance_dif 2.621*** 2.102** 1.660*       
 (3.050) (2.534) (1.896)       
Governance 29.390*** 22.366** 23.073***       
 (3.616) (2.681) (2.843)       
texgini_dif*Rule of Law_dif    2.663*** 2.308*** 1.966**    
    (3.341) (3.097) (2.491)    
Rule of Law    30.755*** 24.916*** 24.954***    
    (4.700) (3.822) (3.244)    
texgini_dif*Accountabilty_dif       2.732*** 1.978** 2.121** 
       (3.358) (2.261) (2.163) 
Accountability       20.131** 24.111** 28.219** 
       (2.023) (2.403) (2.476) 
gdppercap 11.282* 8.796 5.068 9.125 7.038 4.322 17.140*** 11.157** 7.805 
 (1.718) (1.557) (0.862) (1.619) (1.389) (0.744) (3.389) (2.705) (1.635) 
publspending 3.763 2.551 2.152 4.302 3.459 3.373 4.066 1.893 3.342 
 (0.947) (0.624) (0.543) (1.195) (0.950) (0.936) (1.086) (0.492) (0.961) 
density 0.001 0.010*** 0.008** 0.001 0.011*** 0.010** -0.001 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (0.087) (3.078) (2.043) (0.150) (3.758) (2.572) (-0.320) (3.892) (3.191) 
democracy  1.616* 2.156*  1.393 1.880  0.675 1.404 
  (1.763) (1.920)  (1.518) (1.622)  (0.589) (1.158) 
ethnic  -29.022 -31.293  -26.085 -27.791  -25.665 -31.774 
  (-1.424) (-1.377)  (-1.326) (-1.234)  (-1.306) (-1.361) 
old   -1.870   -1.717   -2.940** 
   (-1.164)   (-1.182)   (-2.122) 
fertility   -2.905   -1.937   4.067 
   (-0.256)   (-0.202)   (0.325) 
Geographical Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
obs 55 51 51 55 51 51 55 51 51 
 
 
R2 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.91 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable is the composite PISA score average in Mathematics, Science 
and Reading. All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors.  The set of regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia 
(AsiaE), Latin America or the Caribbean (LaAm), Europe and Central Asia (EurAsiaC) and North America (NAm). In Columns (1)-(3) as proxy for the quality of 
institutions is employed the Government Effectiveness measure developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) (denoted as Governance) whereas the interaction term 
comprises of the product of the mean-centred texgini and mean-centred Governance. In Columns (4)-(6) as proxy for the quality of institutions is employed the 
Rule of Law measure developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) (denoted as Rule of Law) whereas the interaction term comprises of the product of the mean-centred 
texgini and mean-centred  Rule of Law . In Columns (7)-(9) as proxy for the quality of institutions is employed the Voice and Accountability measure developed by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) (denoted as  Accountability ) whereas the interaction term comprises of the product of the mean-centred texgini and mean-centred  
Accountability . The *, ** and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Table A: Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description 
 
Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
min max Source 
PISA (Mean) Composite PISA score average 
in Mathematics, Science and 
Reading. 
62 464.01 56.85 315.34 547.11 Programme for 
International Student 
Assessment (PISA), 
OECD (2011) 
 
PISA Mathematics 
 
PISA score in Mathematics 
(Mean) 
 
62 463.33 60.75 320.87 562.02 Programme for 
International Student 
Assessment (PISA), 
OECD (2011) 
 
PISA Science 
 
PISA score in Science (Mean) 
 
62 467.77 56.22 325.79 555.13 Programme for 
International Student 
Assessment (PISA), 
OECD (2011) 
 
PISA Reading 
 
PISA score in Reading (Mean) 
 
62 460.159 54.23 299.36 543.10 Programme for 
International Student 
Assessment (PISA), 
OECD (2011) 
 
Hanushek and 
Woessmann Cognitive 
 
Average test score in math and 
science, primary through end of 
secondary school, all years 
(scaled to PISA scale divided by 
100) 
75 4.54 0.57 3.09 5.34 Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2012) 
 
Hanushek and 
Woessmann LowSec 
 
Average test score in math and 
science, only lower secondary, 
all years (scaled to PISA scale 
divided by 100). 
75 4.54 0.61 2.68 5.51 Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2012) 
TexGini Texas Inequality Project Gini 
coefficient 
77 40.05 6.80 24.46 54.78 Texas University 
Inequality Project  
Ineq_20 Income share held by the highest 
20% 
69 44.66 7.54 32.51 62.94 World Bank 
Development Indicators 
(2011) 
gini_Solt Gini coefficient (before taxes 
and transfers) developed by Solt 
(2009) 
77 42.33 6.96 29.38 66.12 Solt (2009) 
gdppercap Log of GDP per capita (constant 
2000 US$). 
85 8.46 1.36 5.44 10.90 World Bank 
Development Indicators 
(2011) 
density Population  Density measured as 
number of people per square km 
86 378.97 1596.16 2.27 13026.48 World Bank 
Development Indicators 
(2011) 
ethnic Ethnic Fractionalization. 82 0.36 0.23 0.00 0.85 Alesina et al (2003) 
democracy Polity Democracy Index 76 3.86 6.42 -10.00 10.00 Polity IV (2004) 
Database 
publspending Public Spending on Education 
(as a share of GDP) 
78 4.39 1.36 0.57 7.4 World Bank 
Development Indicators 
(2011) 
fertility Fertility rate, total (births per 
woman) 
84 2.56 1.17 1.32 6.29 World Bank 
Development Indicators 
(2011) 
old Population ages 64 and above 
(% Total Population) 
84 26.93 3.55 14.92 36.17 World Bank 
Development Indicators 
(2011) 
Governance Quality of governance and 
Institutions. Government's 
credibility and commitment to 
specific policies. 
 
82 0.62 0.90 -0.98 2.12 Kaufmann, Kray and 
Mastruzzi (2010), 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). 
Rule of Law Quality of governance and 
Institutions. Quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights and 
the courts. 
83 0.45 0.93 -1.38 1.94 Kaufmann, Kray and 
Mastruzzi (2010), 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Quality of governance and 
Institutions. Freedom of 
expression, freedom of 
association and free media 
83 0.39 0.91 -1.51 1.65 Kaufmann, Kray and 
Mastruzzi (2010), 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). 
Transfers Government Transfers (as a 
share of GDP) 
74 13.38 8.49 1.53 36.5 World Bank 
Development Indicators 
(2011) 
TaxProgress Ratio of statutory tax rate to 
average corporate tax rate 
62 1.85 0.55 1.13 3.62 Own calculations based 
on Djankov et al (2010) 
 
 
 
  
 
